إسماعيل حافظ يعرض علي كيسينجر في برقية "باللغة الإنجليزية" يوم 21 أكتوبر 1973 علي وقف القتال وعقد مؤتمر سلام والربط بين إيقاف القتال وبين تسوية نهائية

[SIZE="5"]إسماعيل حافظ يعرض علي كيسينجر في برقية "باللغة الإنجليزية" يوم 21 أكتوبر 1973 علي وقف القتال وعقد مؤتمر سلام والربط بين إيقاف القتال وبين تسوية نهائية
(برقية من حافظ إسماعيل ، مستشار السادات للأمن القومي إلي هنري كيسينجر وزير خارجية أمريكا)
وثيفة رقم 76;]المصدر قسم الوثائق ، في الأرشيف الرقمي للرئيس محمد أنور السادات في المتحف الرسمي الملحق بمكتبة الأسكندرية http://sadat.bibalex.org/

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إسماعيل حافظ يعرض علي كيسينجر في برقية "باللغة الإنجليزية" يوم 21 أكتوبر 1973 علي وقف القتال وعقد مؤتمر سلام والربط بين إيقاف القتال وبين تسوية نهائية

رغم إنتصار العبور الباهر يوم 6 أكتوبر 1973 ، أرسل يوم 21 أكتوبر 1973 ، حافظ إسماعيل ، مستشار السادات للأمن القومي البرقية التالية باللغة الإنجليزية إلي هنري كيسينجر وزير خارجية أمريكا بعرض فيها التركيز علي وقف القتال وعقد مؤتمر سلام والربط بين إيقاف القتال وبين تسوية نهائية

(برقية وثيفة رقم 76 من متحف السادات بمكتبة الأسكندرية


د. يحي الشاعر

نص صورة برقية من السيد حافظ إسماعيل إلى الدكتور هنري كيسنجر
يوم 7 أكتوبر 1973 تتضمن قول الرئيس السادات بأنه
"لن يعمق مدى الاشتباكات"

Message From Mr. Hafez Ismail
To Dr. Henry Kescinger



-    Dr. Zayat has convoyed to us the talks and discussions that have taken place, between the two of you in the last few days.

1- I would like, in conformity with the spirit of frankness that prevailed in our meetings, to make a few remarks concerning the points which were brought up during your discussions:

The engagements taking place at present in the area should not arouse any surprise to all those who have followed the continuos Israeli provocations not only on the Syrian and Lebanese lines but also on the Egyptian front. We have many times drawn the attention to such provocations which never ceased in spite of international condemnation.

Egypt therefore had to take a decision to confront any new Israeli provocations with firmness, and consequently took the necessary precautions in order to face any such sraelf action similar to that over Syria on 13 th. September 1973.

The clashes that occured on the canal front as a result of the Israeli provocations, were intended from our side to show to Israel that we were not afraid or helpless and that we refuse to capitulate to the conditious of an aggressive planning to rotain our land as hostage for bargaining.

As a result of the engagements a new situation has been created in the area and although it is natural to expect new developments within the coming few days, we would like to define the framework of our position.

- Our basic objective remains as always, the achievement of peace in the Middle East and not to achieve portial settlements.

- We do not intend to deepen the engagements or widen the confrontation.

II- I reckon you have received from Mr. Rockfeller our president, s reply to your message, in which reply our position as pointed out since our first contact was reaffirmed. Allow me to make it clear once more:

1- Israel has to withdraw from all occupied territories.

2- We will be then prepared to participate in a peace conference in the U.N. in whatever agreable from, whether it be under the auspices of the Secretary General or the representatives of the permanent members of the Security Council or any other suitable body.

3- Wo Agree to the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran and we accept, as a guarantee, an international presence for a limited period.

IV.  feel confident that you will appreciate that this ro-explanation of our position emanates from a real and genuine desire for the realization of peace and not from readiness to start a series of concessions. In fact we remember that Mr. Rogers impaired peace chances when he mistakingly interpreted our peace initiative of February 1971 in such a manner that deviated it from its true nature and objective.

   Please accept my best wishes>

Hafes Ismail